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	<title>Comments on: Free Will &amp; Determinism</title>
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	<description>Seek Truth: Find Truth</description>
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		<title>By: James</title>
		<link>http://thinkreason.net/235/free-determinism/comment-page-1/#comment-225</link>
		<dc:creator>James</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Mar 2011 20:37:25 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>I think I agree largely with your article (in philoso-speak I take you to mean that there is a phenomenological representation --&#8216;mind&#8217;--that is reducible to brain functionality, but that that still allows salient functional accounts of intentionality and agency.)  I think however that without going into moral questions of praise and blame you miss the heart of the matter. Nothing could ever prove to me that I don&#8217;t feel like I have control of my future actions, so I find it hard to believe that this is really where the objections to determinism lie. But, if all the good deeds I&#8217;ve preformed were no more then the necessary results of electro-chemical interactions in my brain, well then maybe they weren&#8217;t so good after all. Should criminals be punished for their crimes, or pitied for their flaws? Should the rich get to enjoy the rewards of their success or should we redistribute the rewards of their luck?  These and more are serious concerns that revolve around free will, afar outweighing mere epistemological quandaries. </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think I agree largely with your article (in philoso-speak I take you to mean that there is a phenomenological representation &#8211;&lsquo;mind&rsquo;&#8211;that is reducible to brain functionality, but that that still allows salient functional accounts of intentionality and agency.)  I think however that without going into moral questions of praise and blame you miss the heart of the matter. Nothing could ever prove to me that I don&rsquo;t feel like I have control of my future actions, so I find it hard to believe that this is really where the objections to determinism lie. But, if all the good deeds I&rsquo;ve preformed were no more then the necessary results of electro-chemical interactions in my brain, well then maybe they weren&rsquo;t so good after all. Should criminals be punished for their crimes, or pitied for their flaws? Should the rich get to enjoy the rewards of their success or should we redistribute the rewards of their luck?  These and more are serious concerns that revolve around free will, afar outweighing mere epistemological quandaries.</p>
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